We develop and test a model in which upfront fees are used to compensate lenders for the penalty-free prepayment option in bank loans. In the model, borrowers learn of their type only after investing the loan, causing high-quality borrowers to prepay (or renegotiate). Rasing the credit spread does not counteract this ex post erosion of loan-pool quality. However, we show that a properly calibrated upfront fee reduces prepayment risk and produces an equilibrium without credit rationing. Cross-sectionally, the upfront fee is higher for loans with greater prepayment risk, and lower for loans with performance-sensitive credit spreads, which our largesample evidence supports.
Introduction
U.S. syndicated bank loans (term loans and revolving credit lines) charge upfront fees that average as much as one-quarter of the all-in credit spread (Berg, Saunders, and Steffen, 2016) . These fees are traditionally viewed as compensation for fixed cost of loan origination (Ivashina and Sun, 2011) .
In this paper, however, we develop and test a model in which upfront fees plays a fundamentally different role. In our model, upfront fees exist to reduce prepayment risk created by the penalty-free prepayment option that is a standard feature of bank loans. We test the model predictions using upfront fees in a large sample of U.S. commercial and industrial term loans.
There is substantial evidence to indicate that the penalty-free prepayment option is valuable.
For example, Roberts and Sufi (2009) and Roberts (2015) report that bank-loan renegotiations (effectively a prepayment followed by a new loan) on average occur as much as four times before the typical five-year term runs out. Moreover, the renegotiations are typically initiated by borrowerspresumably demanding better terms. These stylized facts motivate our theoretical analysis, which links the size of the upfront fee to the likelihood that the borrower receives private information over the term of the loan that causes her to prepay.
We focus on a borrower who learns of her type only after investing the loan, through a private signal about the quality of the debt-financed investment project. This approach differs from the focus in much of the extant theoretical literature, in which a menu of loan fees screens borrower types ex ante (at loan origination). 1 In our analysis, the upfront fee instead addresses the bank's concern that some high-quality borrowers will exercise the prepayment option and lower the average quality of the loan pool over the term of the loan. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to model and test a potential role for upfront fees to address prepayment risk.
Interestingly, in our setting, increasing the credit spread at loan origination does not counteract the deterioration of the loan pool resulting from prepayments. Intuitively, increasing the credit spread only increases the incentive for ex post high-quality borrowers to prepay. This suggests that penalty-free loan repayment may lead to credit rationing absent a non-price mechanism for compensating the bank for bearing the prepayment risk. Our main theoretical result is that a properly calibrated upfront fee represents one such mechanism. It permits the bank to lower the credit spread 1 Dunn and Spatt (1985) , Thakor and Udell (1987) , Chari and Jagannathan (1989) , Shockley and Thakor (1997) . and reduce prepayment risk ex ante, producing an equilibrium without credit rationing. 2 An upfront fee is not, of course, the only contract mechanism available to reduce credit rationing.
Beginning with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , the most widely referenced solution is to use collateral. 3 We expand the initial loan contract to include a second alternative: performance pricing, where the credit spread is automatically adjusted over the term of the loan in response to changes in borrower quality (indicated by, e.g., a change in credit rating).
We focus on performance-sensitive debt (PSD) because it has become increasingly popular over our sample period (Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi, 2010) . Interestingly, while the extant literature tends to view PSD as a solution to an agency problem, 4 our analysis instead shows that PSD serves as a substitute to an upfront fee because it also lowers loan prepayment risk. PSD is a viable alternative to an upfront fee as long as the private quality signal received by borrowers is contractible. The coarser the contractible information set, the greater the benefit of combining a PSD with an upfront fee.
Turning to the empirical analysis, we examine three main predictions of our loan pricing model.
The first and most important is that the upfront fee is increasing in proxies for loan prepayment risk. Second, upfront fees are lower for PSD due to the reduction in prepayment risk afforded by the ex post credit spread adjustments. Third, the likelihood of loan renegotiation and loan term amendments is inversely related to the upfront fee. Our empirical evidence exploits information in a sample of nearly 4,000 industrial term loans, originated during the period 1987-2015. As explained below, we find substantial empirical support for all three predictions.
It is worth pointing out that the above empirical predictions are unique in that they restrict the correlation between the size of the upfront fee and the prepayment risk. For example, in Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1987) , a high credit spread induces a moral hazard problem ex ante, in which borrowers erode the value of the bank's debt claim by shifting the risk of the project. An upfront fee may help control this adverse incentive problem. However, as their equilibrium loan contract is renegotiation proof, repayment risk is irrelevant. Prepayment risk is also irrelevant in Thakor and Udell (1987) and Shockley and Thakor (1997) where, in equilibrium, loans are correctly priced after 2 Note that credit rationing in our setting arises for a different reason than in the classical moral hazard framework Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , where borrowers are assumed to privately know their own types at loan origination.
3 Chan and Kanatas (1985) , Besanko and Thakor (1987) , Berger and Udell (1990) , Boot and Udell (1991) , Bester (1994) , Berger, Frame, and Ioannidou (2011) . 4 Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005) , Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi (2010) , Tchistyi, Yermack, and Yun (2011). lenders use the two-part fee structures in revolving credit lines (commitment and utilization fees) to screen borrowers. Of course, this fee-based screening mechanism does not work for term loans since such loans are drawn down when issued regardless of the borrower type.
Finally, since upfront fees and collateral are costly mechanisms for controlling prepayment and default risk, why not impose a prepayment penalty instead? 5 Mayer, Piskorski, and Tchistyi (2013) show that a prepayment penalty may be welfare improving in the context of fixed-rate mortgages.
However, prepayment of fixed-rate mortgages tends to be driven by exogenous changes in the state of the economy (as opposed to by the type of borrower private information dynamics modelled here).
Imposing a prepayment penalty on our term loans is also likely to invite costly bargaining over the penalty ex post. Thus, while answering this question goes beyond the purpose of this paper, it is not unreasonable to think that a properly calibrated upfront fees may be an efficient solution to the problem of regulating loan prepayment risk.
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 describes the model, illustrating how penalty-free prepayments induce non-interest credit rationing and how the use of upfront fees mitigates the prepayment risk.
Section 3 proposes testable implications of the model. Section 4 shows empirical evidence. In Section 5, we discuss potential reasons that allow for penalty-free prepayments. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Prepayment Risk and Upfront Fees: Theory
In this section, we present a simple model where the two parties agree on a rate using all available information at loan origination. As the project progresses, however, the firm learns more about the technology and product market, and hence about the prospects for success (project quality). We first derive the equilibrium rate, r * , with perfect commitment. In subsection 2.3, we allow the firm to repay the loan early without penalty. Since the loan rate r * does not reflect the new information, it becomes supra-competitive (too high) after a good signal and the firm is better off refinancing the loan at a lower rate. Conversely, if the signal is bad, the firm is better off with the loan rate r * and optimally does not refinance. This self-selection results in an ex-post reclassification of borrowers that adversely affects the bank's expected payoff (prepayment risk).
Baseline setup
Consider a bank and a firm with no assets in place. Both parties are risk neutral and symmetrically informed. There are three dates, t = 0, t = θ, and t = 1, where 0 < θ < 1.
At t = 0, the firm has an investment project, which requires one unit of investment. The project will generate a stochastic payoff at t = 1 that is either high (H) or low (L), and where H > 1 > L.
To finance the project, the firm signs a competitive loan contract with the bank. The loan has a face value of 1 and an interest rate r < H − 1, reflecting the ex-ante risk of the project. Hence, the bank will receive 1 + r if the project realizes a high payoff (no default) and L if the payoff is low (default).
At t = θ, the borrower receives a public, but non-contractible signal about the project's quality.
With probability p, the signal is good and the project payoff is H. With probability 1 − p, the signal is bad and the probability of the high payoff is only q. Figure 1 shows the project's payoff structure and Figure 2 summarizes the time-line of the model. We assume that the project has a positive net present value (NPV) ex ante, but a negative NPV following the bad signal, i.e.,
where s ≡ p + (1 − p)q is the probability of the high payoff, H, at time t = 1.
Perfect commitment
We first consider the case where the borrower commits to the contract regardless of the signal. The bank will suffer a loss of 1 − L conditional on a low project payoff and make a profit of r conditional on a high payoff. In a competitive credit market, the bank's break-even interest rate is given by
which implies a unique equilibrium loan rate
Ex ante, the expected loss equates the expected benefit, and the bank breaks even at the loan rate r * , given by Eq.
(3). Hence, with perfect commitment, there is always an interest rate at which the project can be financed.
Penalty-free loan prepayment and credit rationing
Suppose the firm instead can freely prepay or refinance the loan after observing a positive signal.
The firm will now repay at time t = θ if
where α are refinancing costs, reflecting the firm's efforts to negotiate a new loan contract. The left-hand side of Eq. (4) is the cost of keeping the original loan contract, 1 + r. The right-hand side are the costs of prepaying the original loan, 1 + θr, and financing the project through a new loan in competitive credit markets, α. The new loan has zero interest rate since the firm refinances only after a positive signal, when the project payoff is H with certainty. To make prepayment relevant in our model, we assume that α < r(1 − θ), so refinancing costs are relatively small.
Time θ, at which the signal arrives, is an important parameter in the firm's decision to repay the loan. Note that, with perfect commitment, θ = 1 and Eq. (4) is never satisfied. In contrast, if θ = 0, the firm knows more than the bank about the project at contract signing (asymmetric information) and Eq. (4) is always satisfied. However, for θ ∈ (0, 1), there are different implications for the equilibrium loan rate and the firm's decision to prepay the loan.
First, if the positive signal arrives late, i.e., close to loan maturity, so that θ > θ 2 , the refinancing costs will dominate any potential interest savings and the firm will stick to the original loan contract, r * . Combining Eq.
(2) and Eq. (4) yields θ 2 , after which the firm will never prepay:
The lower the refinancing costs and the likelihood of the high project payoff, the closer to maturity is this threshold.
Second, if the project signal arrives earlier than at time θ 2 , so the firm may refinance the loan, the bank's break-even constraint becomes
The left-hand side of Eq. (6) is the expected payoffs to the lender from a positive signal, when the loan is repaid with accrued interest θr, and a negative signal, when the loan continues to maturity.
Eq. (6) implies an equilibrium loan rate of
Note that r * * > r * , compensating the lender for the prepayment risk.
The earlier the signal arrives (lower θ), the higher is the equilibrium loan rate r * * . However, a feasible loan contract requires that the high payoff is sufficient to pay the interest at t = 1, so that 1 + r * * ≤ H. Combining this with the bank's break-even constraint in Eq (6) yields the earliest time, θ = θ 1 , the signal could arrive for r * * to be feasible:
If the signal arrives shortly after contract signing, so that θ < θ 1 , there is no equilibrium loan rate high enough to compensate the bank for the subsequent erosion of the borrower pool. Thus, θ 1 is the critical value, below which the project cannot be financed (credit rationing) with the loan rate alone.
For signals arriving between θ 1 and θ 2 , the project can be funded at the equilibrium rate r * * .
At this rate, the bank is willing to finance the project and allow the firm to refinance without a penalty. Note, however, that the interest rate r * * implies a dead-weight cost in that some projects with low NPV will not be financed (underinvestment). 6
Proposition 1 summarizes the credit rationing that occurs for θ < θ 1 .
Proposition 1 (Credit rationing): If the borrower can prepay the loan freely and project uncertainty is resolved early (θ < θ 1 ), there is no interest rate at which the bank will fund the investment 6 For θ 1 < θ < θ 2 , there are multiple equilibria, featuring either r * * and prepayment or, when θ m < θ < θ 2 , r * and no prepayment, and where θ m ≡ 1 − sα (1−s)(1−L)+pα .
project.
Our model implies that credit rationing can occur when prepayment is penalty-free and learning is fast. The evidence in Roberts and Sufi (2009) is consistent with borrowers learning relatively fast. They document that more than 90% of long-term loan contracts are renegotiated prior to maturity and, in most cases, renegotiations occur early in the life of the loan. This suggests that loan contracts may suffer from credit rationing associated with fast learning ( θ < θ 1 ).
The extant literature generally derives credit rationing from agency problems, such as adverse selection, asset substitution and hidden effort (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Tirole, 2006) . In our setting, rather than changing the risk of the project, high-quality borrowers renegotiate the financial contract once they learn their type. The ex-post erosion of the borrower pool is costly to the bank and, when early enough, makes the bank unable to break even through a high interest rate at loan origination.
How could this kind of credit rationing be mitigated? Since a higher interest rate ex ante increases the likelihood of prepayment, the key is to reduce the original loan rate. One simple solution would be to require collateral, protecting the bank from losses when bad borrowers default.
In principle, if the loan is fully collateralized, L = 1 and the equilibrium interest rate is zero.
As documented by Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and Miller (2011) , collateral is common in loan contracts.
Another possible solution is to reduce prepayment risk by reducing the ex-post mispricing of the loan. One such mechanism is performance pricing, where the loan rate automatically adjusts with the credit quality of the borrower. Before introducing performance pricing in our model, however, we will show that an upfront fee can be used to mitigate credit rationing by compensating the bank in advance.
Using an upfront fee to solve the credit rationing problem
In this section, we consider the use of a properly scaled upfront fee to solve the credit rationing problem in Proposition 1. A sufficiently high upfront fee allows the bank to reduce the loan rate at origination. This lowers the cost r of the current loan contract in Eq. (4) and hence reduces the likelihood that the borrower will refinance the loan after a good signal.
Let y denote an upfront fee that the borrower must pay upfront to obtain the loan. As the borrower has no wealth at t = 0, it borrows 1 + y, pays y to the bank up front, and invests 1 in the project. We consider the case when the upfront fee solves the credit rationing problem through completely deterring prepayment. 7 The result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Upfront fee to eliminate prepayment risk): An upfront fee y ≥ŷ deters prepayment, whereŷ ≡ r * − α 1−θ .
Proof : With the upfront fee y, the face value of the loan is 1 + y. If the upfront fee y completely deters prepayments, the participation constraint of the lender is
There are three parts in the left-hand side of (9). First, if the realized payoff of the project is H at t = 1 with probability s, the lender gets (1 + r)(1 + y). Second, if the realized payoff of the project is L at t = 1 with probability 1 − s, the lender gets L. Third, the lender get an upfront fee y in advance. From equation (9), we solve for the loan rate
Obviously, r < r * , i.e., the use of an upfront fee reduces the loan rate. The incentive constraint of the borrower (not to prepay) is 8
Combining (9) and (11) yields
It is obvious that the minimum requirement of the upfront fee increases with the first-best loan rate 7 With the upfront fee, there is another equilibrium contract associated with prepayment (like Case III of Figure  3 ), and which generates conclusions similar to those in Proposition 2. For simplicity, we do not discuss this contract here.
8 Here we assume that the refinancing costs is independent of whether the upfront fee is charged. Changing this assumption does not affect our model predictions. For example, we may assume that the refinancing costs are larger for loans with a larger face value. In this case, to eliminate predation risk, the minimum requirement of an upfront fee is smaller. r * while decreases with the refinancing costs, α. The first-best loan rate fully reflects the borrower's credit risk, proxied by a higher default rate, 1 − s, and a higher loss in default, 1 − L.
When the loan is high risk (high probability s of the low outcome), the lender requires a high interest rate (r * * ) as compensation. This high rate increases the likelihood that the borrower will refinance the loan after observing a positive signal, eroding the quality of the borrower pool. The upfront fee, however, allows the bank to lower the interest rate and hence reduces the likelihood of strategic prepayment. In the extreme case, when the entire interest is paid in advance, the rate is zero and the borrower will never prepay the loan. Therefore, the upfront fee commits the borrower to the original loan contract and hence allows the project to be financed. That is, credit rationing is solved with a sufficiently high upfront fee. In fact, some other non-price loan instruments, such as collateral and performance-pricing, work in the similar way to reduce loan interest rates.
Contractible signal: performance-sensitive debt
If the signal received by the borrower is verifiable, the loan contract may be written contingent on the signal. While a traditional bank loan before maturity is priced using a fixed interest spread over a floating benchmark such as Libor or prime, performance-pricing instead has a spread based on measures of the borrower's performance such as credit rating or debt-to-EBITDA ratio. Performance pricing is a widely used debt feature. Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi (2010) report that, among bank loans to public firms in the 1995-2005 period in the Thomson Financial's SDC database, approximately 40% include performance-pricing provisions. We now show that performance-sensitive debt (PSD) or performance-pricing can mitigate prepayment risk and hence reduce the required upfront fee.
Consider the contract that specifies an upfront fee y and an interest rate r. This interest rate will be adjusted according to the signal at t = θ. After t = θ, it is either changed to r g following a positive signal or r b following a negative signal. That is, the interest rate is based on borrower performance, measured by the expected payoff at t = 1. Following the previous section, we only consider the credit rationing problem when t <= θ * * * and propose a solution with no prepayment.
The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Performance-pricing): Suppose the signal is contractible. Then a performance-sensitive debt (PSD) mitigates prepayment risk and hence reduces the need for an upfront fee.
Proof : The loan contract specifies the upfront fee y and three interest rates, r, r g and r b . We assume that all interest, including the accrued interest at t = θ, will be paid at t = 1. As prepayments are completely deterred, the break-even constraint of the lender is
In the left-hand side of equation (13), the first part is the expected payment to the bank with a positive signal, and the second and third parts are the expected payments with a negative signal when there is no default or there is default respectively. Note that prepayment matters only with the positive signal. The incentive constraint of the borrower (not to prepay) is hence
Let consider a simple case with r = r g and r b = r g + , where is a positive constant. In this performance-sensitive contract, the loan rate will be raised if the borrower performance worsens. It is hence called interest-increasing performance-pricing. 9 From equation (13), we solve for the loan rate
Comparing the above equation with equation (10), we see that the loan rate of a PSD contract is lower than that of a traditional straight debt contract. Combining (15) and (14) yields
Obviously,ŷ >ŷ psd . That is, the minimum requirement of the upfront fee is lower in the case of a PSD contract.
To recapitulate, penalty-free prepayment makes the lender unable to capture the high original interest following the positive signal while bearing the loss following the negative signal. Note that 9 A loan contract can include interest-increasing performance-pricing, interest-decreasing performance-pricing, or both. For example, if we set r = r b = rg + , we can have interest-decreasing performance-pricing. Instead, if we set r = r * and r b = rg + , we have a contract with both interest-increasing and interest-decreasing performance-pricing. It is not difficult to show that in any of the cases, we reach the same conclusion that the use of PSD mitigates prepayment risk by lowering the loan rate with a good signal (r g ) while raising the loan rate with a bad signal (r b ). only the loan rate following a positive signal matters for prepayments. When a performance-sensitive loan is used (because the signal is contractible), the loan rate following a negative signal can be set higher relative to a straight debt with a fixed loan rate, and hence the loan rate following a positive signal can be set lower. This lower loan rate following a positive signal mitigating the borrower's incentive to prepay the loan following the positive signal, reducing the minimum requirement of an upfront fee.
In general, the literature shows that PSD is used to deal with agency problems (e.g., Asquith, Beatty, and Weber, 2005; Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi, 2010; ?) . Our model points to the role of PSD in mitigating prepayment risk, substituting for other non-interest instruments, such as the upfront fee or collateral.
Testable Hypotheses and Empirical Methodology

Hypotheses
In practice, unlike bonds which compensate lenders through interest payments alone, bank loans are frequently associated with an upfront fee. The upfront fee, also called arrangement fee or participation fee, is a one-time fee collected at the closing of the transaction. It is typically included in a fee letter separated from the loan contract (Taylor, Sansone, et al., 2006) . As a monetary transfer from the borrower to the lender, the upfront fee is traditionally thought of as compensation for the lender's fixed costs associated with originating the loan. For example, the largest part of the upfront fee for a syndicated loan goes to the lead arranger as compensation for structuring the loan (e.g., Ivashina, 2009 ). However, fixed costs can also be charged through interest, so this traditional "fixed-costs" story cannot explain why the fixed costs are charged in the form of an upfront fee, instead of interest.
Our theoretical model links the use of upfront fees with prepayment risk. The model directly generates two testable implications concerning the use of upfront fees. First, Proposition 1 shows that prepayment risk makes the lender unable to get compensated only through the interest, so noninterest loan terms are necessary to reduce the loan interest rate and hence mitigate prepayment risk. Proposition 2 further shows that if the price of the loan is partly paid by an upfront fee, the lender requires a lower loan interest rate, which mitigates prepayment risk and hence allows the project to be financed. Following the model prediction in Proposition 2, we form our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis I: The level of the upfront fee increases with prepayment risk of the loan.
Second, we document in Proposition 3 that performance-pricing works as a substitute for an upfront fee. Relative to the fixed loan rate of a straight debt, the interest rate for interest-increasing performance-pricing can be adjusted higher following a bad signal and hence lower following a good signal. This lower interest rate with a good signal (when prepayment is relevant) reduces the possibility of prepayment. Interest-increasing performance-pricing therefore mitigates prepayment risk. In a similar vein, we can show that interest-decreasing performance-pricing reduces the upfront fee as well, because the interest rate following a good signal can be set lower if the interest rate before the signal and following a bad signal is set high. Therefore, both types of performance-pricing have a negative effect on the level of upfront fees.
Hypothesis II: Performance-pricing mitigates prepayment risk and hence reduces the use of upfront fees.
The above two hypotheses are directly derived from our model. We now form the third hypothesis following the intuition of the model. Note that, when there is improved credit quality (i.e., following a positive signal), the borrower will prepay the original loan and replace it with a cheaper one. That is, improved credit quality of borrowers triggers loan renegotiations. This is what we observe in practice. Roberts and Sufi (2009) and Roberts (2015) report that 90% of long-term debt contracts are renegotiated prior to their stated maturity. According to our model, an upfront fee paid in advance reduces the interest rate of the loan and hence the borrower's incentive to renegotiate or prepay the loan. We therefore conclude that all else equal, a higher ex-ante upfront fee should reduce loan renegotiations ex post. This is our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis III: Loans associated with larger upfront fees should be less likely renegotiated.
It is worth emphasize that implicitly, the loan contract in our theoretical model is a term loan.
Our model predictions and the above three hypotheses are hence all concerning term loans, for which the credit is fully drawn down at the origination. This is different from another widely used credit form, lines of credit, which establish a maximum loan balance that the bank will permit the borrower to maintain. The borrower can draw down on the line of credit at any time, as long as he or she does not exceed the maximum set in the agreement. In practice, the fee structure of credit lines is more complicated than that of term loans (e.g., Berg, Saunders, and Steffen, 2016) . For example, in addition to upfront fees, lines of credit may include commitment fees, which maintain the option of the borrower to hold the undrawn-down credit, and utilization fees that are paid according to the drawn-down credit. Shockley and Thakor (1997) argue that fees of lines of credit can be used as a screening device to sort borrowers. The intuition is simply as follows. Suppose that there are two types of borrowers.
The bad type is more likely to draw down loan commitments, so a commitment fee on the unused balance may screen out the bad type. They provide empirical evidence to support this screening effect of fees, especially commitment fees and utilization fees, for credit lines. Our theory is concerning term loans, and our empirical analyses will also focus on term loans only, for which the screening effect in Shockley and Thakor (1997) does not exist.
Empirical models and variables
We now propose empirical models to test the three hypotheses. To test Hypothesis I, we employ the following model,
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the upfront fee of a loan (logUpfrontFee), measured in basis points (bps). Prepayment Risk is the proxy for prepayment risk, and X is a set of control variables. By expectation, β 1 in equation (16) is positive.
The key to test model (16) is to find proper proxies for prepayment risk. We use several classes of proxies. The first class of proxies is borrower performance volatility. Asquith, Beatty, and Weber (2005) argues that firms with higher than expected volatility in performance are more likely to experience a change in credit quality and are thus more likely to prepay the loan. Inspired by this argument, we use the stock return volatility and cash flow volatility to measure borrower performance volatility and hence to capture prepayment risk. In particular, we define Return
Volatility as the standard deviation of return of the firm in 12 months prior to loan origination, and Cash Flow Risk as the variance of EBITDA in the past 8 quarters, scaled by the book value of assets. According to our model, prepayment risk is captured by the upside potential of the investment project. We admit that the two performance volatility measures we have here capture both the upside and downside of the firm. Empirically the upside and downside of the firm or project are highly correlated, and it is extremely difficult to separate them. (A FEW words to emphasize that this is not a big problem for us.)
Our second class of proxies for prepayment risk is measures of the business cycle. The intuition is that during economy downturns, some firms borrow loans with high spreads. When the economy recovers later, there are high probabilities that these borrowers prepay the high-spread loans, and refinance through cheaper ones. This prepayment risk is what we modeled theoretically, and is particularly high during economy downturns. To capture the downturn of the business cycle, we use two variables, Bond Spread and Recession Dummy. Bond Spread is defined as the Bank of America (BOA) BB-rated bond yield minus the 3-month T-bill rate, both in basis points. This spread reflects the average cost of public debt in the market and the general economic conditions.
Recession Dummy is equal to one if the U.S. economy is experiencing a recession in the quarter.
We follow the NBER definition and assign three recessions in our sample period: 1990.07-1991.03, 2001.03-2011.11, and 2007.12-2009. 06. An important advantage of using the two proxies for the business cycle is that they are relatively exogenous to loan design, alleviating potential endogeneity problems.
Our third class of proxies for prepayment risk includes measures of relationship borrowing. We consider whether the borrower has an established relationship with its lead banks or lead arrangers in the current syndication. Relationship banks have relative monopoly power over borrower information, making it more difficult for borrowers to switch to other lenders (e.g., Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992; Mosk, 2014) . This lock-in effect reduces prepayment risk. To measure borrower-bank relationships, we follow Sufi (2007) and Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2003) , and search all previous loans of a borrower as recorded in the DealScan database (as opposed to only the loans included in our sample). We then trace each borrower's borrowing history, and define Borrowing
Frequency as the number of loans that the firm borrowed from the same lead arranger(s) of the current syndication in the past 10 years. More frequent borrowing indicates a stronger borrower-lender relationship. Another measure is Relationship Dummy that is equal to one if the firm borrowed a loan from the same lead arranger(s) in the past 5 years. We use 5 years for the second measure instead of 10 years for the first measure in order to make the dummy variable more balanced.
The fourth and last class of proxies is the magnitude of refinancing costs. Proposition 2 shows that the minimum requirement of the upfront fee is lower if the loan has higher refinancing costs.
The intuition is: Borrowers who intend to prepay their loans have to pay the refinancing costs;
higher refinancing costs thus raise the burden of borrowers to prepay the original loan and hence reduce prepayment risk. To measure refinancing costs, we follow the literature and use the number of lenders in the loan syndicate (logNum_Lenders). Arguably, a larger number of lenders makes the contracting process more complicated and hence raises the renegotiation costs (e.g. Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Brunner and Krahnen, 2008) .
It is worth mentioning that Proposition 2 also shows that prepayment risk is higher for loans with a higher first-best price, r * , which by definition is the price of the loan if prepayments are
forbidden. Ideally, we should test whether the upfront fee is positively associated with this firstbest loan price. However, the first-best loan price is unobservable in practice. As the effective loan price, it is a combination of the loan interest spread or all-in-spread (AIS ), the upfront fee, as well as other annualized fees. Although the loan price in practice commonly refers to the loan interest spread only, the upfront fee or other fees can be substantial (e.g., Berg, Saunders, and Steffen, 2016) .
In our sample, the upfront fee is on average over 30% of the loan interest spread. As the upfront fee and the loan interest spread are jointly determined, we cannot use the interest spread as a proxy for the first-best loan price and hence for prepayment risk.
To test Hypothesis II concerning the use of performance-pricing, we simply replace Prepayment Risk in equation (16) by the indicator for performance-pricing or performance-sensitive debt ( PSD), which equals one if the loan has the performance-pricing feature.
Performance-pricing is a widely observed debt feature in practice (e.g., Manso, Strulovici, and Tchistyi, 2010) . According to Proposition 3, performance-pricing can be a substitute for an upfront fee in terms of mitigating prepayment risk. The intuition is that with performance-pricing, the loan interest rate following a bad signal can be set higher, allowing a lower loan interest rate following a good signal and hence a lower prepayment risk. We thus expect that performance-pricing has significantly negative effect on the use of upfront fees. As predicted by our model, both interest-decreasing and interest-increasing performance-pricing reduces the upfront fee, so we also replace PSD by PSD_Increasing or PSD_decreasing, which are respectively the indicator for the two types of performance-pricing.
Hypothesis III states that the propensity of renegotiation is lower for loans with higher upfront fees. When the borrower paid a high upfront fee at the loan origination, the interest spread is lower than the case if the upfront fee is not paid. This lower interest spread reduces the incentive of the borrower to escape from higher interest payment after an improvement of credit worthiness, and hence reduces renegotiation of original loans. Renegotiation of loans is followed by loan amendments.
We thus regress the number of loan amendments on the upfront fee to test Hypothesis III. The empirical model is specified as follows:
We measure the propensity of renegotiation by log(1+Num_Amendment ), i.e. the logarithm of one plus the number of loan amendments. A loan amendment is a modification of the loan terms before maturity, which is reported in the firm's 8K, 10K or 10Q files (Ivashina and Sun, 2011) . In practice, loan renegotiation boils down to a private conference call with the lenders, during which the borrower explains its financial condition and reasons for renegotiation. A successful renegotiation leads to loan amendments.
In the above empirical tests, we control for a set of variables that are commonly used in the empirical literature, including non-price loan characteristics, borrower characteristics and market conditions. Non-price loan characteristics include the loan size (logAmount ), maturity (logMaturity) in months, and dummy variables for loan purposes (Purpose) and security status (Security). The loan all-in-spread (AIS ) and the upfront fee are simultaneously determined, so adding AIS as a control to our regressions causes serious endogeneity issues. We thus do not include AIS in the above analyses. However, non-price loan features, such as collateral requirements, are usually fixed before the syndication process (Ivashina, 2009) . For example, Mosk (2014) using a large sample of loans in Holland finds that these terms are determined before negotiating the loan interest rate and fees . This justifies the use of the non-price loan characteristics as control variables.
Borrower characteristics include firm size (logAssets), the market-to-book ratio (Market-to-Book ), leverage (Leverage), profitability (Proftability ), tangibility (Tangbility ), the Altman Z-score (Altman, 1968 ) (Z-Score), and a dummy variable that is equal to one for S&P rated firms (Rated Dummy). Firm size is defined as the logarithm of total book assets. The market-to-book ratio is defined as the sum of the market value of equity and total debt divided by total assets. Leverage is defined as the borrower's market leverage, i.e., the total debt divided by the sum of total debt and market value of equity. Profitability is measured by return on assets. Tangibility is the ratio of net PP&E to total assets. These are the commonly used explanatory variables in relevant research. To reduce the effect of possibly spurious outliers, we winsorize all these variables both at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. The definition of all the variables is summarized in Appendix I.
Moreover, we include lead-bank fixed effects, year fixed effects and 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects to control for potential lender characteristics, time trends, and industry attributes that might be correlated with the use of upfront fees or loan renegotiations. Following Carey, Post, and Sharp (1998) , loan purposes are categorized into four groups: general purposes ("working capital" and "general corporate purpose"), recapitalization ("debt repayment/consolidation", "recapitalization", and "debtor-in-possession loan"), acquisition ("general or specific acquisition program" and "LBO loans") and others. Ross (2010) documents that the 10 largest banks collectively arranges over 85% loans in the U.S. We thus control for lead-bank fixed effects using the 11 dummies with the top 10 largest banks and the rest as one group. We identify top banks in our sample based on either the lending frequency or volume of lending. The two approaches generate almost identical classification.
For brevity, we only report results using the classification based on borrowing frequency. Finally, we cluster standard errors at the firm level.
Empirical Analysis
Main loan terms and fees: An example
The loan syndication process (see e.g. François and Missonier-Piera, 2007) starts with negotiations between the borrower and the lead bank(s) (the "arranger" or the "leader") on the terms and provisions of the debt contract. The arranger then collects confidential bids from other banks ("members" or "participants") regarding their contributions to the loan. Finally, she proceeds to the allocation of the loan parcels. In addition to initiating and setting up the syndicate, the arranger has to issue the legal documents, administer the loan, and hold the collateral, if any. In practice however, the arranger often delegates these administrative tasks to other banks, acting as "co-agents". For instance, the "documentation agent" drafts the loan documents, and the "administrative agent" calculates the interest payments and collects loan repayments.
In Appendix II, we present an example of a bank loan which was signed between Peabody The contract specifies fees for both facilities. 10 First, there is a tiered upfront fee ranging from 50 to 100 bps, which is a one-time fee paid by the issuer at close. In practice, most often, the upfront fee is paid on a lenders final allocation. According to the allocation schedule in the last column of the table, Morgan Stanley is allocated $80 million of the total loan amount and gets 62.5 bps of this allocated amount, or $0.5 million, of the upfront fee. In aggregate, the lenders get an upfront fee of over $12 million. It is difficult to argue that such a high upfront fee is only to compensate the lender for fixed costs of originating the loan. Second, both facilities have a commitment fee of 50 bps, which is a fee paid to lenders on undrawn amounts under the revolving credit.
In addition to the two types of fees in the above contract, there are other fees in bank loans in general, such as the cancelation fee in term loans and the utilization fee and facility fee in revolver credit lines. The cancellation fee is a feature generally associated with institutional term loans.
Typical prepayment fees will be set on a sliding scale; for instance, 2% in year one and 1% in year two. The facility fee or annual fee, included in the all-in-spread of the loan. The utilization fee or usage fee is a fee paid when the utilization of a revolving credit is above, or more often, below a certain minimum. The last two types of fees are rarely charged for term loans. A good summary of fees can be seen in Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2016) .
Data and sample statistics
The loan data used to test the hypotheses are taken from the WRDS DealScan Database. The database contains the majority of new loans made to public firms in the United States. 11 As our focus is term loans, we start with all term loans in DealScan issued by U.S. borrowers between January 1987 and December 2015. We merge DealScan with Compustat quarterly data based on the link table initiated by Chava and Roberts (2008) . We exclude loans to regulated and financial industries, identified with the 2-digit SIC codes: 40-45, 49, 60-69, and 99. We also exclude observations that miss any of the key firm characteristics in Compustat, including total assets, total debt, Ebitda, PP&E and stock price, which are necessary to construct the firm controls for our empirical analyses. This results in our sample of 3,915 term loans issued by 1,772 unique firms. Finally, the average number of loan amendments is only 0.53. Roberts and Sufi (2009) has an average of 86.77 bps. Second, a higher borrowing frequency from the same lean bank(s) is associated with significantly lower upfront fees. This is consistent with the argument that banks utilize the information power to hold up relationship borrowers, and hence make the loans more difficult to be renegotiated. This higher renegotiation costs reduce prepayment risk and hence the use upfront fees.
Univariate tests
In Panel B we report the mean and median upfront fees for performance-sensitive loans (PSD) and non-PSD loans. The average upfront fee for PSD loans is only 53.81 bps, while it is 90.78 bps for non-PSD loans. That is, performance-pricing is associated with significantly (40.72%) lower level of upfront fees, consistent with our Hypothesis II.
Finally, in Panel C, we report the univariate results on the relationship between the use of upfront fees and loan amendments. Although Hypothesis III states that a higher upfront fee reduces future loan amendments, the results do not indicate any significant relationship.
Prepayment risk and upfront fees
Performance volatility and the level of upfront fees
Proposition 2 suggests that prepayment risk raises the level of upfront fees in term loans. Based on this proposition, we form Hypothesis I that the upfront fee is higher for loans with higher prepayment risk or lower refinancing costs. To test Hypothesis I, we run OLS regressions employing the empirical model (16). Our first class of proxies for prepayment risk are borrower performance volatility. Results are shown in Table 4 .
In columns (1)-(3) of Table 4 , the proxy for prepayment risk is the borrower's stock return volatility (Return Volatility ). In column (1), we have only firm characteristics as controls with no fixed effects. Stock return volatility has a positive coefficient that is significant at the 1% level, confirming Hypothesis I. The economic magnitude is quite large. For example, a one-standarddeviation increase of stock return volatility (16.13) increases the upfront fee by 5.2%. In column (2), we add loan characteristics, including loan amount, maturity and security, as well as loan purpose and bank fixed effects. The non-price loan characteristics are possibly jointly determined with the pricing variables (i.e., the interest spread and the upfront fee), so there could be simultaneity bias when using the loan variables as controls. Nevertheless, as Ivashina (2009) argues, the nonprice loan variables are usually fixed before the syndication process and can hence be used as control variables. The coefficient of Return Volatility is consistently significant at the 1% level and economically large. In column (3), we further add 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. Again, the effect of stock return volatility remains highly significant both statistically and economically. According to column (3), a one-standard-deviation increase of stock return volatility increases the upfront fee by 4.4%.
In columns (4)-(6), we use borrower's cash flow risk (Cash Flow Risk ) as the proxy for prepayment risk. Similar to stock return volatility, cash flow risk enters the regression with a significantly positive coefficient. A one-standard-deviation increase of stock return volatility increases the upfront fee by around 6-8%. In column (7), we include both Return Volatility and Cash Flow Risk. These two performance volatility measures could capture different dimensions of firm performance volatility. In the same regression, both of them are significantly positive and the economic magnitude retains, confirming all earlier results.
Finally, in column (8), we add the dummy indicator for whether the loan includes a cancellation fee that is charged against termination or commitment reduction. It is a feature generally associated with institutional term loans (ITLs), and is set on a sliding scale: for instance, 2% in year one and 1% in year two. Among the 3,195 loans in our sample, 733 (or 22.9%) have a non-missing cancellation fee, and 403 of the 733 are ITLs. The cancellation fee dummy has a positive coefficient that is highly significant. As termination of contract or commitment reduction can be considered as prepayments, the results may indicate that loans with very high prepayment risk are more likely to be charged both an upfront fee and a cancelation fee. (MORE Argument on Cancelation Fee)
The results in this table confirm that borrower performance volatility, as a proxy for prepayment risk, raises the level of upfront fees, even after controlling for time trend and industry heterogeneity.
Among the firm control variables, a few have consistently significant coefficients across all specifications. For example, firm size (logAssets) has a weakly negative effect on the use of upfront fees, market leverage (Leverage) has a significantly positive effect, while profitability has a significantly negative effect. Reasons for these results could be that leverage is positively related to firm's stock return volatility and hence raises prepayment risk, while firm size and profitability are associated with lower firm performance volatility and hence lower prepayment risk. Among the loan control variables, loan maturity (logMaturity) has a significantly negative coefficient, while Security has a positive one. Both coefficients are counterintuitive. We would think that a loan with a longer maturity is more likely to be prepaid, so a higher upfront fee is required to compensate for the higher prepayment risk. Moreover, the use of collateral reduces the loan interest spread and should mitigate hence prepayment risk. However, the opposite signs of the two variables could stem from the fact that in the data, loans with longer maturity and secured loans have higher loan interest spreads. Another possibility for the higher upfront fee in secured loans is that collateral punishes ex-post bad borrowers only, while an upfront fee punishes both ex-post bad and ex-post good borrowers. As a result, borrowers accept high upfront fees only after they exhaust collateral, so secured loans are more likely to have upfront fees.
Business cycles and the level of upfront fees
Using firm performance volatility to proxy prepayment risk in the previous section could suffer from two critics. The first critic is that performance volatility is basically a measure of firm risk, including both the upside and the downside of firm performance, while voluntary prepayment in our model matters only for the upside. In this sense, performance volatility cannot be a good measure for prepayment risk. However, if the volatility measures are exogenous to the loan fee structure, the positive association between volatility and the level of upfront fees is still reliable.
The second possible critic is exactly endogeneity of using these measures: there could be other ommited variables that drive both borrower performance volatility and the level of upfront fees, resulting in their positive association.
To mitigate this endogeneity concern, we further use measures of the business cycle to capture prepayment risk. During economy downturns, firms suffer from performance drop and hence borrow high-spread loans. These loans are more likely to be refinanced through cheaper ones when later the economy recovers and credit market condition improves. To capture the downturn of the business cycle, we use two variables, Bond Spread and Recession Dummy. Bond Spread is the spread of the BOA BB-rated bonds, which reflects general conditions in the bond market. Recession Dummy is an indicator for the U.S. economy experiencing a recession.
The regression results are reported in Table 5 . In columns (1)-(4), Bond Spread is used to capture the business cycle. We include only firm controls in column (1), and gradually in columns (2)-(4) add loan controls, year and industry fixed effects, and firm performance volatility measures. In all columns, Bond Spread enters the regression with a significantly positive coefficient. The economic magnitude is seizable. For example, according to column (4) when all controls are included, a one standard increase (2.00) of the BOA BB-rated bond spread raises the upfront fee by 14%. This is consistent with our Hypothesis I that prepayment risk raises the level of upfront fees. In columns (5)-(8), we redo the regressions while replacing Bond Spread by the Recession Dummy. In all columns, as expected, the recession dummy has a positive and significant sign. According to column (8), loans made during recessions have a 16% higher upfront fee than loans made outside recessions.
The effect of relationship borrowing and refinancing costs
Our last classes of proxies for prepayment risk are relationship borrowing and loan refinancing costs. First, relationship borrowing is associate with lower prepayment risk, because the private information which the bank collects over the relationship could give the bank an informational monopoly and enable them to extract informational rents from good firms (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992) . The relative more bargain power of relationship banks makes it more difficult for borrowers to prepay high-cost loans and switch to other lenders. Therefore, relationship borrowing should be associated with lower upfront fees. Second, Proposition 2 of our model directly predicts that the upfront fee is lower for loans with higher refinancing costs, which raise the burden of borrowers to prepay and hence reduce prepayment risk.
We report empirical evidence in Table 6 . In columns (1)-(4), borrowing relationship is captured by Relationship Dummy, an indicator for whether the firm borrowed a loan from the same lead bank(s) in the past 5 years. As usual, we include only firm controls in column (1), and gradually add loan controls, year and industry fixed effects, and firm performance volatility measures in columns (2)-(4). Relationship Dummy has a negative coefficient at the 1% significance level in all four columns. According to column (4), loans from relationship banks have a 15% lower upfront fee than loans from non-relationship banks. In columns (5)-(6), we use Borrowing Frequency to capture the intensity of the borrowing relationship. A more intense relationship significantly reduces the level of upfront fees. The results support Hypothesis I.
Finally, in columns (7)- (8), we examine how refinancing costs affect the level of upfront fees by including in the regression the number of lenders of the loan (logNum_Lenders). A syndicate with more lenders is more difficult to renegotiate, so refinancing costs are higher and prepayment risk is lower. Column (7) include firm and loan characteristics as controls, as well as the year and industry fixed effects. The coefficient of logNum_Lenders is significantly negative at the 1% level.
Economically, adding one more lender in the loan syndicate from the sample mean (5.96) reduces the upfront fee by 8%. Finally in column (8), we further add measures of firm performance volatility and the cancellation fee dummy and draw the same conclusion.
Performance-pricing and the level of upfront fees
Our model predicts that, if the signal of credit quality improvement is contactable, performancepricing can be used to mitigate prepayment risk and hence reduce the level of upfront fees. Performancepricing has two categories: interest-increasing and interest-decreasing. For the former, interest spread at origination will be adjusted up automatically following performance drop, while for the latter, interest spread at origination will be adjusted down automatically following performance improvement. Among the 3,195 loans in our sample, 847 (26.51%) include performance-pricing, with 351 (10.99%) interest-increasing and 747 (23.38%) interest-decreasing. That is, 291 (9.11%) loans have both interest-increasing and interest-decreasing performance-pricing features.
Hypothesis II states that performance-pricing works as a substitute for an upfront fee. This is because the interest rate for interest-increasing performance-pricing can be adjusted higher following a bad signal and hence lower following a good signal, while this lower interest rate with a good signal reduces prepayment risk. Similarly, interest-decreasing performance-pricing reduces the upfront fee, because the interest rate following a good signal can be set lower if the interest rates before the signal and following a bad signal are set high. To test this hypothesis, we design empirical model (17) by defining the dummy variable, PSD, which is equal to one if the loan has the performancepricing feature. Alternatively, we use two more dummies, PSD_Increasing and PSD_Decreasing.
PSD_Increasing is equal to one for interest-increasing performance-pricing, and PSD_Decreasing is equal to one for interest-decreasing performance-pricing. Results of OLS regressions are reported in Table 7 .
In column (1), only the PSD dummy and firm controls are included. PSD enters with a negative coefficient that is significant at the 1% level, confirming Hypothesis II and predictions of our theoretical model. The coefficient, -0.41, suggests that the upfront fee for loans with performance pricing is 41% lower than that for loans without performance pricing. This effect is really large. In column (2), we add loan controls, including then loan characteristics, and loan purpose and bank fixed effects. The effect of PSD is even stronger. We further add industry and year fixed effects in column (3), and the performance volatility measures in column (4). In all columns, the effect of PSD remains significantly negative at the 1% significance level. In particular, according to column (4) with the full set of controls, the upfront fee for loans with performance pricing is 16% lower than that for loans without performance pricing. The results confirm our Hypothesis II.
In columns (5) and (6) 
Upfront fees and loan renegotiations
A higher upfront fee paid in advance reduces the loan spread and hence the incentive of the borrower to prepay the loan following an improvement in credit quality, so it reduces future loan renegotiations or amendments as Hypothesis III states. To test this hypothesis, ideally we use data on loan renegotiations or amendments that are due to improved credit quality or borrower's prepaying incentives. The DealScan database includes some information on loan amendments, but reasons for these loan amendments are unknown. They can be due to covenant violations, which are irrelevant to voluntary prepayments as we modeled. However, Roberts and Sufi (2009) and Roberts (2015) report that in practice, most long-term loans are renegotiated multiple times over relatively short horizons. Renegotiations are rarely a consequence of distress or default, but initiated by borrowers primarily in response to changing conditions such as improved credit quality. We can think of each change of contract terms as prepaying the original loan and refinancing it through a new one, that is, most renegotiations in practice are due to voluntary prepayments as we modeled. This allows us to use the loan amendment data in DealScan to test Hypothesis III.
Among the 3195 term loans in our sample, 625 or 19.56% are amended before maturity. On average, these loans are amended 2.69 times, and the median number of amendments is 2.00. There are 48 loans amended over 5 times. With hand-collected data from 10Ks, Roberts and Sufi (2009) To test Hypothesis III, we regress the logarithm of one plus the number of loan amendments before maturity, i.e. logNum_Amendments, on the upfront fee and a set of control variables. Results are shown in Table 8 . As logNum_Amendments is bounded by zero, we estimate a Tobit model.
In column (1), we only include the firm controls in the regression. The coefficient of log UpfrontFee is significantly negative at the 10% level. We then add loan controls in column (2) and year and industry fixed effects in column (3). The significance of logUpfrontFee increases to 1%. We further add the proxies for prepayment risk, PSD and logAIS in column (4). Results of all columns confirm our hypothesis that a higher upfront fee reduces the future propensity of loan amendments. The economic magnitude is also large. According to column (4), a one percent increase in the upfront fee reduces the number of loan amendments by 0.06% (CORRECT?).
The negative association between the level of upfront fees and loan amendments in the first 4 columns is consistent with our model predictions, and confirms Hypothesis III. In these tests, we include only term loans because our model is concerning only term loans. In column (5) of Table   8 , we replicate the regression in column (4) but use the sample of revolver credit lines only. The selection of the sample of credit lines is similar to that of term loans. Interestingly, we see that the level of upfront fees has a positive effect on future loan amendments. (Do we need this? If yes,
EXPLANATIONS!)
The choice of the upfront fee is made at the loan origination, while loan amendments are all made after loan origination. This time difference makes it less likely that our results are driven by reverse causality. And we also include a large set of firm and loan controls in the regressions that mitigate the omitted variable bias.
5 Further Discussions: Why prepayments are penalty-free?
We document in theory that non-interest terms are necessary to mitigate prepayment risk. In practice, non-price instruments are widely observed debt features. The use of these instruments may trigger additional costs. For example, there could be deadweight losses due to the inefficient delivery of collateral in default or the lender's costs of screening, monitoring and repossessing the pledged assets (e.g. Berger, Frame, and Ioannidou, 2011) . Similarly, the use of upfront fees for liquidity-constrained firms may be costly as well. Therefore, it is natural to think of prepayment penalty as a substitute for non-interest terms. However, most private debt agreements do not carry any prepayment penalty. A natural question is: Why are prepayments penalty-free?
Financial Flexibility
Beyond the simple purpose of replacing the current loan by a cheaper one, prepayments may occur for many other reasons, e.g. new investment opportunities, takeovers, or change of previous business plans adapting to the uncertain competitive environment. Therefore, although a penalty can reduce or even eliminate prepayment risk due to the borrower fleeing to cheaper funding, it imposes additional costs on the borrower to make new investments and to modify business plans. One could consider a penalty contingent on the purpose of prepayments. This is the case in mortgage markets,
where refinancing due to home movements can be easily separated from those due to changes of the market interest rate. However, it is generally difficult for the lender to distinguish the purpose of prepayments for C&I loans. Consequently, to avoid inappropriately penalizing refinancing with other purposes than fleeing to cheaper funding, the optimal choice is to exclude prepayment penalty in the contract ex ante.
Because prepayment penalties and non-interest instruments are substitutes to compensate lenders for prepayment risk, there is a trade-off between callability and restrictions on non-price loan terms.
The option to call the loan freely at any time has important value for firms with large growth opportunities and firms facing intensive competition. For these firms, loans include the call option, while compensate the lender through non-pricing loan instruments. Instead, for firms with few investment opportunities and in less competitive industries, the gain from the option to prepay freely cannot offset the costs due to restrictions on the non-price instruments. For these firms, it is optimal to give up the free prepayment option in favor of relaxing restrictions on non-price instruments. Consistent with the above argument, bonds that are mostly issued by large firms exclude the free call option to relax constraints on non-price terms. In contrast, C&I loans are usually bundled with the free call option but strict constraints on non-interest terms, such as seniority, security, fees and covenants.
Time Inconsistency
The upfront fee reduces the interest payment similar to a prepayment penalty paid in advance. What is the difference for the borrower between paying the "penalty" at the time of prepayment and paying in advance? One important reason is that prepayment penalty induces the time-inconsistency problem in the sense that ex-ante optimal contract may not be optimal ex post (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) . Ex ante, when the contract is signed, the two contract parties set the fair risk premium, based on the borrower's future perspective. Ex post, when a signal concerning credit quality arrives, the original loan contract is no longer optimal. In particular, the original high interest rate is not fair for borrowers with improved credit quality. For these borrowers, a revision of the original contract can align the conflicts of interest between borrowers and lenders.
In particular, after an improvement of credit quality, the borrower has better outside options and hence more bargain power. If the lender rejects prepayments or renegotiations and still forces the borrower to pay the currently-unfair interest, the lender might lose a good reputation or destroy the good borrower-lender relationship. In an extreme case for small businesses, if the borrower is denied to prepay the loan, she might choose to walk away (e.g. Hart and Moore, 1994) . This may force the lender to accept prepayments ex post and then induce credit rationing ex ante for borrowers with severe hold-up problems. The influence of human capital is larger for small firms and firms with high R&D investment, especially start-ups. For this reason, venture capital widely uses non-compete and vesting provisions to mitigate hold-up problems (e.g. Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003) .
Conclusion
A penalty-free prepayment option is valuable for the borrower, allowing early repayment in full or renegotiation of loan terms following positive borrower-specific news. The problem for the bank, however, is that prepayments and loan renegotiations together erode the value of the loan portfolio ex post. In this paper, we provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of how banks combine the loan interest with a properly scaled upfront fee to help compensate for this prepayment risk. Our model assumes that borrowers are symmetrically informed at the time of loan origination. As a result, the bank offers a single loan contract to all potential borrowers. As some borrowers receive new and positive information about their investment project payoffs, they strategically repay or refinance the loan. Conversely, ex post low-quality borrowers hold on to their loans and some default.
In equilibrium, the initial contract terms must account for this ex post reclassification process that adversely affects the average quality of the bank's remaining pool of borrowers. We show that raising the original loan rate will not solve the bank's problem: a higher credit spread just makes it more likely that high-quality borrowers prepay ex post. Due to the prepayments, the bank fails to capture the full interest payments on the loan no matter how high it sets the spread. We show that the bank's solution is to adopt some combination of non-interest loan provisions such as collateral to lower default risk and an upfront fee to reduce the interest. In sum, a properly scaled upfront fee charged equally to all borrowers may suffice to support the penalty-free prepayment option.
We investigate the proposition that upfront fees are increasing in prepayment risk using a sample of nearly 5,000 C&I term loans with information on upfront fees available on the WRDS DealScan Database between 1/1987 and 12/2015. The upfront fees are often substantial and average as much as 250 basis points in the top quartile of the fee distribution. We produce several empirical results that collectively support the notion that upfront fees in term loans help compensate for prepayment risk. Upfront fees are increasing in the loan spread, as well as proxies for borrower credit risk, and they are lower when refinancing costs appear to be higher, as predicted.
We also separate out performance-sensitive term loans where credit spreads are automatically reset up or down in response to performance changes. Our model predicts a lower upfront fee because performance-sensitive debt reduces the adverse reclassification that occur when only the high-quality borrowers repay or renegotiate the term loan. With performance-sensitive debt, spreads are automatically reseat for both high-quality and low-quality borrowers ex post, lowering the reclassification risk. Consistent with this argument, we find that upfront fees are lower for performance-sensitive debt after controlling for performance volatility.
Furthermore, we also examine potential effects of the upfront fee on loan renegotiation activity.
In our model, a higher upfront fee reduces voluntary loan renegotiations ex post. Roberts (2015) confirms that renegotiations are initiated by borrowers primarily in response to changing conditions, as opposed to lender interventions due to default. Using information in DealScan on the number of loan amendments to measure loan renegotiation frequency, we find a negative association between upfront fees and the number of loan amendments, as predicted.
While these empirical results support our model interpretation of upfront fees, they are also difficult to square with the alternative hypothesis that upfront fees simply cover the fixed costs of loan origination. For example, our finding that upfront fees increasing with the loan spreads is surprising from the perspective of the fixed-cost hypothesis. Moreover, it is difficult to appeal to fixed-costs of loan origination to explain why the upfront fee is lower for performance-sensitive debt.
Finally, since the upfront fee is renegotiation proof, it eliminates the need for costly ex-post bargaining with a borrower who has been revealed as high quality and thus is likely to face valuable outside options ex post. A further advantage is that the upfront fee does not induce underinvestment:
all borrowers pay the same fee upfront and are free to renegotiate ex post. Both facilities include a commitment fee of 50 bps, a facility fee of 50 bps, and an upfront fee specified as follows:
• 100 bps for lenders taking 150 million and over;
• 75 bps for lenders taking 100 million and over; • 62.5 bps for lenders taking 50 million and over;
• 50 bps for lenders taking 35 million and over.
Both facilities include performance-pricing according to the Total-Debt-to-Cash-Flow ratio, specified as follows:
• If the ratio is over 3.5, the spread is 350 bps.
• If the ratio is between 3.0 and 3.5, the spread is 325 bps.
• If the ratio is between 2.5 and 3.0, the spread is 300 bps.
• If the ratio is between 2.0 and 2.5, the spread is 275 bps.
• If the ratio is between 1.5 and 2.0, the spread is 250 bps.
• If the ratio is below 2.5, the spread is 225 bps. This figure shows the payoff structure of the project. There are three dates, t = 0, t = θ, and t = 1, where 0 < θ < 1. At t = 0, the borrower starts an investment project that will generate a stochastic payoff at t = 1, which is either high (H) or low (L), where H > 1 > L. At t = θ, the borrower will receive a signal about the payoff of the pending project. With probability p, the signal is positive and the project will generate the H-payoff for sure. With probability 1 − p, the signal is negative and the probability of the H-payoff is q. Figure 3 ). In Case I, θ > θ 2 . The bank and the borrower can agree on a loan contract with the loan rate of r * at t = 0, which will not be refinanced following a positive signal. In Case II, θ 1 < θ < θ 2 . The project can be financed through either a contract with a loan rate of r * that will not be refinanced at t = θ (similar to case I) or through another contract with a loan rate of r * * that will be refinanced at t = θ.
In Case III, θ 0 < θ < θ 1 . The bank and the borrower can agree on a loan contract with a loan rate of r * * at t = 0, which will be refinanced following a positive signal at t = θ. In Case IV, θ < θ 0 . A high interest before t = θ is not sufficient to compensate the bank and the project hence cannot be financed. Early loan repayment causes credit rationing. This figure shows the frequency of loans in our sample (left y-axis), and the mean upfront fee and all-in-spread (AIS) of these loans (right y-axis) over time in [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Starting from the DealScan database, we keep only term loans issued by U.S. firms in 01/1987 -12/2015. We then drop loans to regulated and financial industries, identified with the 2-digit SIC 40-45, 49, 60-69, and 99 , and exclude loans with missing upfront fee information in DealScan and loans to borrowers with missing total assets information in Compustat. We end up with 3195 term loans, issued by 1,772 unique borrowers. Table 1 . Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, and t-values are shown in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the upfront fee, measured in basis points. The table uses two measures for the business cycle as proxies for Prepayment Risk. These measures are, respectively, the BOA BB-rated bond yield minus the 3-month T-bill rate (Bond Spread ) and a dummy indicating that the U.S. economy is experiencing a recession in the quarter according to the NBER definition (Recession Dummy ). X is a set of control variables capturing firm and loan characteristics. The sample is 3,195 U.S. term loans from DealScan, 1987-2015. All variables are defined in Table 1 . Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, and t-values are shown in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) The dependent variable is the logarithm of the upfront fee, measured in basis points. The table uses measures for relationship borrowing (Relationship Dummy and Borrowing Frequency ) and refinancing costs (logNum_Lenders) as proxies for Prepayment Risk. Relationship Dummy indicates whether or not the firm has borrowed from the same lead arranger in the past 5 years, Borrowing Frequency is the number of loans to the firm by the same lead arranger in the past 10 years, and logNum_Lenders is the logarithm of the number of lenders in the loan syndicate. X is a set of control variables capturing firm and loan characteristics. The sample is 3,195 U.S. term loans from DealScan, 1987-2015. All variables are defined in Table 1 . Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, and t-values are shown in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Relationship Dummy -0.26*** -0.24*** -0.18*** -0.15*** (-5.08) (-4 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the upfront fee, measured in basis points. PSD is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the loan has the performance-pricing feature. PSD_Increasing and PSD_Decreasing are indicators for, respectively, interest-increasing and interest-decreasing performance-pricing. X is a set of control variables capturing firm and loan characteristics. The sample is 3,195 U.S. term loans from DealScan, 1987-2015. All variables are defined in Table 1 . Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, and t-values are shown in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) To test Hypothesis III, the table reports coefficient estimates from Tobit regressions for the renegotiation propensity of the loan: log(1 + Num_Amendment) = γ 0 + γ 1 * logUpfrontFee + Φ * Z +
The dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus the number of loan amendments (log(1+ Num_Amendents )), used as a proxy for the loan renegotiation propensity. The key explanatory variable of interest is log UpfrontFee. The sample is 3,195 U.S. term loans from DealScan, 1987-2015. All variables are defined in Table 1 . Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, and t-values are shown in parentheses.
Term Loan Revolver
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logUpfrontFee -0.09* -0.14*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 0.06*** (-1.79) (-2.88) (-6.79) (-6.07) (5.51) logAssets 0.23*** 0.19*** 0.12*** 0.15*** -0.05*** ( 6.29 
